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Abstract. With the increasing availability of AI-based decision support, there is
an increasing need for their certification by both AI manufacturers and notified
bodies, as well as the pragmatic (real-world) validation of these systems. Therefore,
there is the need for meaningful and informative ways to assess the performance
of AI systems in clinical practice. Common metrics (like accuracy scores and areas
under the ROC curve) have known problems and they do not take into account
important information about the preferences of clinicians and the needs of their
specialist practice, like the likelihood and impact of errors and the complexity of
cases. In this paper, we present a new accuracy measure, the H-accuracy (Ha),
which we claim is more informative in the medical domain (and others of similar
needs) for the elements it encompasses. We also provide proof that the H-accuracy
is a generalization of the balanced accuracy and establish a relation between the
H-accuracy and the Net Benefit. Finally, we illustrate an experimentation in two
user studies to show the descriptive power of the Ha score and how complementary
and differently informative measures can be derived from its formulation (a Python
script to compute Ha is also made available).
Keywords. predictive models, accuracy, Machine Learning, Medical Artificial
Intelligence, Validation
1. INTRODUCTION
It has become a truism that the interest in medical AI has risen markedly in the last
few years, with the accumulation of studies that, mostly in experimental settings and on
retrospective data (e.g. [15,20]), but also prospectively (e.g. [1]), demonstrate that Ma-
chine Learning (ML) models, and the decision support systems integrating these models,
can achieve a level of discriminative and predictive performance on a par with human
clinicians, or even a slightly higher performance on very specific tasks [27,36].
A higher interest attracts more funding, and this in its turn allows for more mar-
ket supply of systems that, nevertheless, to be marketed need to be validated and certi-
fied by competent bodies [10]. This sheds light on, and attaches a renovated importance
1Both authors contributed equally to this work. Corresponding author: Federico Cabitza,
federico.cabitza@unimib.it.
Code to compute the Ha score available at https://github.com/AndreaCampagner/uncertainpy
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for, any valid and reliable measure of the performance of decision support applications
that utilize machine-learning-based models, both to facilitate health technology assess-
ment [18], product precertification and version-based approval renewals that deal with
the continuous evolution of these systems, and also to give prospective users insights on
the practical usefulness of these otherwise “opaque” and difficult-to-scrutinize systems.
Over time, the scholarly and professional community of statistical and machine
learning has developed many metrics to assess and report the performance of discrimi-
native models [38]: some metrics are common and easy-to-comprehend, like accuracy,
recall (also known as sensitivity), specificity, the F1 score (i.e., the harmonic mean of
sensitivity and specificity), and the area under the ROC curve (AUROC); others are less
common and less straightforward, like the Youden index (or Informedness), the Cohens
Kappa, the Matthews correlation coefficient (i.e., the geometric mean of other Marked-
ness and Informedness), the Gini coefficient (that is derived from the AUROC), the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov measure and the logarithmic and Hamming loss. Also recent rec-
ommendations developed for the reporting of prediction models, like TRIPOD (Trans-
parent reporting of a multivariable prediction model for individual prognosis or diagno-
sis [14]), do not generally recommend any specific measure, despite their comprehen-
siveness (the above TRIPOD encompasses a 22-item checklist).
In lack of more specific reporting guidelines, and notwithstanding the variety of
metrics available (or right because of it), in the medical literature one measure of model
performance is much more common than the others, and this is accuracy: the proportion
of correct predictions with respect to the total number of predictions made. Accuracy is
obviously related to error rate (that is the complementary concept), and represents the
capability of the model to provide the decision maker with the right recommendation for
any case at hand.
“Getting the right answer” seems “a good standard to use to judge the quality of
a decision support system [but] there are problems with this criterion” as said in [6].
Indeed, despite its apparent simplicity, accuracy scores can be misleading or, at least, do
not tell the full story. For instance, it is generally well known that the accuracy of an ML
model must be evaluated on a test set, that is, on different instances from those used to
train the model, otherwise its high values could mirror over-fitting rather than informing
about the actual goodness of the model.
Another potential source of bias lies in highly imbalanced test datasets, for which
a so-called accuracy paradox has been observed, that is when “high accuracy is not
necessarily an indicator of high classifier performance” [39]. Thus, in case of datasets
where classes are unevenly represented, alternative measures have been proposed instead
of regular accuracy, like the Matthew correlation coefficient [13] and the balanced ac-
curacy [9]: in particular, this latter is intuitively defined as the average of the accuracy
obtained on each class individually. To illustrate this point, in Figure 1 we show how
increasing the difference in the prevalence of the two classes of a binary discriminative
task makes regular and balanced accuracy diverge progressively, so that the meaningful-
ness of the former and more common type of accuracy, which is blind to class prevalence
problems, can be disputed2 [39]. Moreover, not only the regular accuracy, but also the
balanced accuracy neglect other meaningful aspects of the latent variation of the training
2The same problem affects the area under the ROC curve, another very common performance metrics in
medical AI that is criticized also for other problems, like the one of averaging the performance of a model on
(operating) points that lack real utility or real-world significance [35].
datasets, a problem that has been recently denoted as hidden stratification [31]: accuracy
can be high for a ML model, but this latter still misses relevant findings, that is conditions
that can have a strong impact on the patient’s outcome.
Figure 1. Regular accuracy, here conventionally set at 80%, and balanced accuracy coincide if the dataset is
perfectly balanced; however, as class prevalences differ, so different measures of accuracy do. Mind that at a
certain point the difference in prevalence is combined with a difference in the accuracy for each class.
We also believe that scores of regular accuracy (and partly also those of balanced
accuracy) are only a partial way to convey meaningful information on the usefulness and
practical value of a predictive model: this is mainly because these metrics overestimate
the model performance and do not take into account important characteristics of the test
set (besides class imbalance): the importance of rightly detecting one class at the expense
of the other(s), according to the users’ preferences; the extent the model gets the right
answer by chance (and hence its intrinsic reliability); and the complexity of the cases
correctly identified (and hence the difficulty of the discrimination for a human rater).
For this reason, in this paper we present a new accuracy measure, and related met-
rics, the H-accuracy, or Ha, which we claim is more informative in the medical domain
(and other domain with similar requirements) as it covers all of the aspects mentioned
above. We show the descriptive power of our proposal on a well-known dataset used to
compare and evaluate medical artificial intelligence in the radiological domain, and also
provide proof that the H-accuracy is a generalization of balanced accuracy and hence a
proper measure of accuracy alternative to regular accuracy, and whose properties make
it suitable to assess the “skills” of predictive ML models.
2. METHOD
In what follows, we will describe the method by which to derive a multi-parametric (and
hence multi-dimensional) type of classification accuracy that we propose to better mirror
the rich and multi-faceted meanings the original construct of accuracy has in naturalistic
decision making [25]; and the method by which we designed the user studies through
which we derived the parameters empirically by involving experts and prospective users
of the decision support to be evaluated in terms of accuracy.
2.1. The H-accuracy metrics
In what follows we report the formula for the H-accuracy (see Equation 3). Assume for
the following that we deal with a classification task in which the set of classes (or labels)
is C = {l1, ..., lk}; we have a dataset of instances S = {x1, ...,xn} sampled from the space
of all possible osservations X and the real class of instance x is given by a function
c : X 7→ C. We consider as possible predictive models only scoring models (notice that
this assumption is not restrictive, given that most Machine Learning (ML) models are, or
can be defined as, scoring models), that is a model m is defined as m : X 7→ [0,1]k where,
given m(x) = 〈l1m(x), ..., lkm(x)〉, lim(x) represents the confidence that model m attaches
to the event c(x) = li, thus we also define m(x) = argmaxli lim(x) (i.e. the class in C for
which m has maximum confidence, which is traditionally what we assume m provides
if asked for explicitly labeling an instance x). Under this framework, accuracy (what we
will term regular accuracy) of a model m is defined as:
a(m) =
1
|S| ∑x∈S
1m(x)=c(x) (1)
where 1 is the indicator function. Balanced accuracy, on the other hand, is defined
as:
Ba(m) =
1
|C| ∑l∈C
1
|{x ∈ S : c(x) = l}| ∑x∈S:c(x)=l
1m(x)=c(x) (2)
We then introduce the formula for the H-accuracy of a model m as:
Ha(m|τ,p,d) = ∑
l∈C
(
p(l)∗ ∑
x∈S:c(x)=l
d(x)
∑c(x)=l d(x)
∗σm(l(x)|τ)
)
(3)
where:
1. p(l) is the weight (or priority) associated to label l ∈C (with ∑l∈C w(l) = 1), that
is a representation of the relative importance attached to the fact that the model
correctly predicts that label;
2. d(x) ∈ [0,1] is the complexity of instance x, that is the intrinsic (i.e., independent
of the single decision maker) difficulty of making the correct prediction about the
case x;
3. l(x) is the prediction score for class l on instance x;
4. σ(l(x)|τ) is a penalty function defined as3:
3Notice that when τ = 1|C| the function is defined as σ(l(x)|τ) =
{
0 l(x)< maxc∈Cc(x)
1 l(x)≥ maxc∈Cc(x)
σ(l(x)|τ) =

0 l(x)< maxc∈Cc(x)
l(x)− 1|C|
τ− 1|C|
maxc∈Cc(x)≤ l(x)≤ τ
1 l(x)> τ
(4)
Before analyzing the terms in Ha in more details, we first prove that Ha is a proper
generalization of the balanced accuracy (Ba) and, thus, a proper accuracy measure:
Proposition 1. Let C = {l1, ..., lk} τ = 1|C| , p(l1) = ...= p(lk) = 1|C| and ∀x∈ X .d(x) = k.
Then ∀h.Ba(m) = Ha(m|τ,p,d).
Proof.
Ha(m|0.5, 1|C| ,k) =
1
|C| ∑l∈C ∑x∈S:c(x)=l
k
k ∗ |{x ∈ S : c(x) = l}|1m(x)=l (5)
from which, by rearranging terms and simplifying, we obtain the statement.
In what follows, we explain each term in the definition of the Ha measure in greater
detail:
1. Consider first term σ(lm(x)|τ); this terms represents a penalty which is assigned
to the model m for its prediction on instance x whose real label is l, by assigning a
lower relevance in the accuracy computation to this instance if the confidence of
the model in its prediction is too small (i.e. lower than τ , which represents a con-
fidence threshold). First of all notice that for regular accuracy (and also balanced
accuracy) we have that τ = 1|C| σ(lm(x)| 1|C| ) = 1 if lm(x) = maxc∈Cc(x) and 0
otherwise, thus, to be meaningful, it must always hold that τ ≥ 1|C| . Furthermore,
according to the definition of the σ function as in Equation 4, when the model
does not have enough confidence in its best prediction (i.e. lm(x)< τ) the penalty
function provides a linear interpolation between 0 and 1 on the prediction score
given to class l for instance x;
2. The σ component of the formula, described in the previous point, is then
reweighed by the term d(x)∑c(x)=l d(x) , which essentially weighs an instance x by its
relative difficulty (normalized) thus assigning greater importance on more diffi-
cult instances in the computation of the accuracy;
3. The partial accuracy due to a specific class l ∈C (i.e. the inner sum in Equation
3) is then weighed by p(l) which represents the importance (e.g. defined by the
prospective users of the predictive model) of correctly predicting on instances
whose real class is l (and thus a preference towards avoiding mis-classifications
for l instances) possibly sacrificing some accuracy on other classes. Notice, for
example, that in balanced accuracy ∀l ∈C.p(l)= 1|C| because we have, by default,
no preference in favor of any specific classes. Thus, the effect of the external
summation is to compute a weighed average of the l-specific contributions to the
accuracy in which the weighing factors are defined by p.
A 3D visualization of the Ha function, for binary classification tasks, with respect
to the priority of the positive class p(1) and the proportion d of complex cases (this
proportion, is in turn used to randomly sample a set of specific instances of the d function,
which are then average to obtain a smoother profile surface) is shown in Figure 2.
If, for the sake of the argument, we assume the equivalence in semantics of τ in both
formulations, we can relate the H-accuracy also with the Net Benefit [40]. This latter one
is defined as:
NB(τ) = T PRτ ∗pi− (1−pi)∗ τ1− τ FPRτ (6)
where τ is a probability threshold (sometimes called risk), pi is the prevalence of the
positive class, T PRτ and FPRτ are the values of the true positive rate and false positive
rate at a fixed probability threshold τ .
Theorem 1. Let
σrisk(l(x)|τ) =
{
1 (l(x)≥ τ ∧ l = 1)∨ l(x)> (1− τ)∧ l = 0
0 otherwise
(7)
.
Then NB(τ) = Ha(τ,p=〈
τ∗(1−pi)
α ,
(1−τ)∗pi
α 〉,d=k),σrisk
1−τ ∗α − τ∗(1−pi)1−τ , where α is a normal-
ization factor.
Proof. NB(τ) = T PRτ ∗pi− (1−pi)∗ τ1−τ FPRτ = T PRτ ∗pi− (1−pi)∗ τ1−τ (1−T NRτ).
Then
(1− τ)∗NB(τ) = (1− τ)∗pi ∗T PRτ + τ ∗ (1−pi)∗T NRτ − τ ∗ (1−pi) (8)
If we let α = τ ∗ (1−pi)+(1− τ)∗pi be a renormalization factor, then
(1− τ)∗NB(τ)
α
= Ha(τ,p : 〈τ ∗ (1−pi)
α
,
(1− τ)∗pi
α
〉,d : k,σrisk)− τ ∗ (1−pi)α (9)
hence the result.
In particular, setting pi = 0.5,
NB(τ = 0.5) = Ha(0.5,p = 0.5,d = k)−0.5 = Ba−0.5 = J(τ = 0.5)
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where J is the Youden index [42]. Using the same technique, a similar relationship can
be established between the Ha and the standardized Net Benefit sNB = NBpi (also known
as relative utility) [3,4,5]: in particular when pi = 0.5 it holds
(1− τ)∗ sNB(τ) = Ha(τ,p : 〈τ,1− τ〉,d : k,σrisk)− τ
. We will see in Section 4 why the relation between the Ha and the NB is of interest for
the comprehensive evaluation of decision support systems.
2.1.1. Relevant instances of Ha
In what follows we define three relevant instances of Ha by focusing on each of its
parameters p(l), d(x) and τ , and fixing the other variables, to some constant.
Thus we define prioritized accuracy at a specific p, by means of Formula 3
(Ha(p) := Ha(m| 1|C| ,p,k)), that is an accuracy that takes into account the perceived dif-
ferential importance of avoiding different kinds of error by the decision support in di-
agnostic practice. When a panel of raters are also called to re-classify an already estab-
lished ground truth, preferences can be set considering their classification performance.
For instance, looking at a ROC space, as the one depicted in Figure 4 one can notice
whether the points are placed closer to the left side of the chart than to the right side or
not, thus indicating a preference for specificity or sensitivity, respectively. Analytically,
the value of p can be determined as described in Formula 10, by computing the average
true positive rates and true negative rates (which, in ROC space, are respectively the y
coordinate and the opposite of the x coordinate, i.e. 1− x) and then normalizing in order
to satisfy the constraint that the priorities must sum to 1.
p(0) =
mean(T NR)
mean(T PR)+mean(T NR)
p(1) =
mean(T PR)
mean(T PR)+mean(T NR)
(10)
Complexity allows us to define practical accuracy: this is a score that takes into
account the capability of the predictive model to provide the correct recommendation for
the complex cases, that is when the decision maker needs its support more [30], assuming
that in the easiest cases the decision makers could override the model’s recommendation
more easily and be less affected by automation bias [2,17] (that is the tendency of users
to be misled by the wrong advice given by decision supports that they consider reliable).
In particular in what follows, we will consider the distribution d of complexities ob-
tained by considering the average complexity observed in a user study for each case and
then transforming these averages according to a two-level complexity scale, by mapping
cases with low to average complexity to a complexity value of 12 and cases with high re-
ported complexity to a value of 1 (after this transformation, the complex cases, i.e. those
with d(x) = 1 were approximately a third of the whole dataset). In Section 4, we will see
other possible ways to define d(x).
Lastly, also a confident accuracy can be defined (i.e. Ha(τ) = Ha(m|τ, 1|C| ,k)), that
is an accuracy estimate that takes into account the error rate when the decision support
is confident “enough” of its recommendation and that considers that, for all of the other
cases (equated to cases in which the model “takes a guess”), errors are just errors and
right answers are penalized, proportionally with respect to the related confidence (or
prediction score). To this aim, let us consider τ in Formula 3: this can be seen as a sort of
confidence threshold, under which the model should abstain from giving advice and, if
it does not abstain (as in traditional machine learning), its accuracy score gets penalized,
so to weight out the role of chance that “inflated” it. To set τ parameter in Formula 3, we
will normalize the (ordinal) confidence level observed in a user study and find, for each
fraction r ∈ [0,1] of correctly classified cases, the maximum confidence level for which
at least r correctly classified cases corresponds (more details will be given in Section 4,
where also alternative ways to set τ will be discussed).
2.1.2. Relevant properties of Ha
Lastly, in what follows we will consider the properties of the Ha measure with respect
to the invariance laws defined in [38], which analyse different kinds of invariance of any
accuracy measure with respect to transformations of the confusion matrix (CM). We will
focus on the binary case (i.e. C = {0,1}, for which the CM can be expressed as:[
t p f n
f p tn
]
(11)
where tp, fn, fp and tn represent, respectively, the true positives, false negatives,
false positives and true negatives.
First of all, we can observe that in order to consider if the Ha satisfies the mentioned
invariance properties it is necessary to constrain the measure so that it is properly defined
on a confusion matrix: this requires fixing τ = 0.5, indeed if this is not the case then Ha
does not strictly operate on the confusion matrix (indeed, it can be seen that the basic
equality t p+ tn+ f p+ f n = N may not hold) so in the following we will assume that
τ = 0.5 without explicitly pointing this out in all propositions. Furthermore, being Ha a
proper generalization of Ba (and, also, of sensitivity and specificity, see [38]) in its most
general parametric form the measure needs only satisfy the following property:
Definition 1. An accuracy measure f is I6 invariant if it is invariant under uniform
multiplicative changes, that is f (
[
t p f n
f p tn
]
) = f (k
[
tn f p
f n t p
]
)
Proposition 2. Let d = k then Ha(p) is I6 invariant.
Proof. Ha(p) = p(0) tntn+ f p +p(1)
t p
t p+ f n = p(0)
k∗tn
k∗tn+k∗ f p +p(1)
k∗t p
k∗t p+k∗ f n
However, for each invariance property Ii (except I7, as we will show below) it is
possible, by appropriately setting p,to obtain specific instances of the Ha satisying at
least property Ii.
Definition 2. An accuracy measure f is I1 invariant if it is invariant with respect to
exchange of positive and negative classes, that is if f (
[
t p f n
f p tn
]
) = f (
[
tn f p
f n t p
]
)
Theorem 2. Let τ = 0.5 and d(x) = k. Then if p(1) = t p+ f nN and p(0) =
f p+tn
N Ha(p) is
I1 invariant by swapping p(0)p(1) when exchanging classes.
Proof. In this case we have that Ha(p)= p(0) tntn+ f p +p(1)
t p
t p+ f n . Then we have Ha(p)=
tn+t p
N = a which is I1 invariant.
Definition 3. An accuracy measure f is I2 invariant if it is invariant with respect to
changes of tn; is I3 invariant if it is invariant with respect to changes of t p; is I4 invari-
ant if it is invariant with respect to changes of f n; is I5 invariant if it is invariant with
respect to changes of f p; is I8 invariant if it is invariant under rows’ changes, that is
f (
[
t p f n
f p tn
]
) = f (
[
k1 ∗ tn k1 ∗ f p
k2 ∗ f n k2 ∗ t p
]
) with k1 6= k2.
Theorem 3. Let τ = 0.5 and d(x) = k. Then if p(0) = 0 Ha is I2 and I5 invariant, if
p(1) = 0 Ha is I3 and I4 invariant; in both cases it is I8 invariant.
Proof. In the first case we have that Ha = p(1) t pt p+ f n , in the second case we have that
Ha = p(0) tntn+ f p which, respectively, satisfy the two properties. Both instances of Ha
satisfy the I8 invariance
Definition 4. An accuracy measure f is I2 invariant if it is invariant under columns’
changes, that is f (
[
t p f n
f p tn
]
) = f (
[
k1 ∗ tn k2 ∗ f p
k1 ∗ f n k2 ∗ t p
]
) with k1 6= k2.
Then, evidently:
Proposition 3. Ha is not I7 invariant.
Figure 2. The surface profile of the Ha function with respect to the proportion of complex cases and the
priority assigned to the positive class (1, in our case, abnormal imaging with some lesion). See also Figure 3 to
see the projection of the surface on the accuracy/complexity plane.
Notice, relevantly, that in [38] any invariance property (and the negation of invari-
ance I7) is naturally associated with a specific Machine Learning setting for which sat-
isfaction of the invariance property corresponds to soundness of an accuracy metrics.
Notice, also, that while in the previous results we focused only on the case of constant
complexity across the cases, similar results can be obtained under any complexity distri-
bution d, although in the general case it is more difficult to provide a simple, analytical
expression for the appropriate values to give to the parameter p.
Figure 3. The behavior of the model performance (Ha) as a function of the proportion of complex cases.
The accuracy degradation both by increasing and decreasing the number of complex cases can be explained
with the training being optimized for a specific proportion of complex cases, and for other potential hidden
stratifications.
2.2. The empirical setting
In this section we report about two user studies. In the first study we involved 31 doctors
working in one of the largest Italian teaching hospitals specialized in musculoskeletal
disorders, the IRCCS Orthopedics Institute Galeazzi of Milan. In the second study, we
involved 13 radiologists from the same hospital, by asking them to annotate a sample of
417 cases randomly extracted from the MRNet dataset4, which encompasses 1,370 knee
MRI exams performed at the Stanford University Medical Center (with 81% abnormal
exams, and in particular 319 Anterior Cruciate Ligament (ACL) tears and 508 meniscal
tears). Our sample was balanced with respect to abnormal cases and type of abnormality.
In both studies we used an online questionnaire platform (Limesurvey, version
3.18 5) and invited the participants by personal email. In the first study, we asked the
doctors to indicate: 1) what the minimum acceptable accuracy an ML model should ex-
hibit in order to be clinically useful in their diagnostic decision making; 2) whether they
preferred to be supported by a predictive model that was configured to optimize either
sensitivity, or specificity, or also that was less accurate but “privileged” neither sensitiv-
ity or specificity. While the questionnaire administered in this first study was longer and
encompassed further items that we will not consider in this paper, we will focus on these
two items, by which we collected the necessary preferences to set the parameters of Ha.
4https://stanfordmlgroup.github.io/competitions/mrnet/.
5https://www.limesurvey.org/
The second study was more articulated. As anticipated above, we involved 13 ra-
diologists (of different MRI reading skills, which we stratify in two subgroups, higher-
and lower-proficiency according to self-assessment) in a diagnostic task where they were
called to discriminate the MRNet cases that were positive, and indicate whether these
regarded either ACL or meniscal tears: in particular they had to say whether the pre-
sented imaging presented a case of ACL tear (yes/no), or a meniscal tear (yes/no): hence
two decisions in total. The radiologists were also requested to assess each case in terms
of complexity (or difficulty in giving the correct answer) on an ordinal scale, and the
confidence with which they classified the case, on an ordinal scale as well.
Also this study was conceived to get indications for the parametrization of the Ha
construct in Formula 3.
3. RESULTS
Table 1. The accuracy of each rater involved in the empirical study in detecting ACL tears, meniscal tears, and
for all of the cases.
Min Max Avg Std
Acc. ACL 0.83 0.88 0.86 0.02
Acc. Men 0.78 0.83 0.80 0.02
Acc. Tot 0.78 0.86 0.82 0.02
Figure 4. The radiologists diagnostic performance on the MRNet dataset in terms of TPR and FPR; full circles
indicate expert radiologists; empty circles lower-expertise MRI readers (self-assessed). The blue line represents
the ROC curve of our predictive model.
Figure 5. From left to right, the minimum diagnostic accuracy (the mean accuracy is indicated in red with its
95% confidence interval); and the preferences about what kind of accuracy is more important at class level. In
both cases, N=31.
In Figures 5, 4, 6 and 8 we graphically report the main elements collected from the
two user studies described in Section 2. In particular, Figure 5 report the minimum ac-
ceptable diagnostic accuracy that the involved clinicians deemed necessary to have a use-
ful support; and the preferences about what kind of accuracy they deem more important
at class level
In Figure 8 is shown the distribution of the reported confidence levels for the cases
that had been classified correctly. Notice that, as expected, the majority of the correctly
classified cases was associated with a medium to high confidence level.
In Figure 6 is shown the complexity of each case (a single circle in the figure),
related to the average confidence of the raters and their accuracy for that specific case.
Figure 4 shows the radiologists’ performance at the labelling task (with respect to
the MRNet Gold Standard) and the ROC curve of a ML model, namely a Convolutional
Neural Network, that we developed on the MobileNet architecture [23], originally trained
on the ImageNet dataset and then re-trained via transfer learning on the full MRNet
training set (except the 417 instances considered in this study, which were then used to
evaluate the performance of our ML model). This model achieves an Area under the ROC
curve (AUROC) of .89 and an accuracy of 0.84 (see a in Table 2). The mrnet-baseline
model developed by the Stanford University (still the best to date on this dataset) achieves
an AUROC of .91, and an accuracy of 0.85 [8].
The accuracy of the performance of each rater is also reported in Table 1 more
analytically. Moreover, from the first study we got that the preferred average minimum
accuracy for a diagnostic support was 93.8 [CI: 92.4,95.3]: incidentally, we also asked
the respondents about the minimum prognostic accuracy (that is the capability to predict
the patients’ health status in the future) and this resulted to be almost ten points lower;
this probably reflects the fact that human raters are much worse in predicting the future
than interpreting present conditions [41].
This latter result can inform the setting of τ and hence the evaluation of confident
accuracy. Thus, with reference to Figure 8, we report four confident accuracy scores on
the basis of different values of τ: τ = 0.6, that is the minimum confidence level reported
Figure 6. A scatter plot showing the negative correlation between the average normalized confidence of the
ratings for each case and the average perceived complexity of the cases labelled. We also report whether the
cases were rated correctly or not (in red and blue, respectively).
by radiologists which corresponds to the maximum number of correct answers; τ = .75,
that is the confidence associated with the majority (cumulated) of right answers (i.e., the
50.1% of the area under the integral in Figure 8, from the right); τ = .8, that is the the
confidence level reported by the radiologists corresponding to the quarter of correct an-
swers with highest reported confidence (that is the answers for which the risk of guessing
game is the lowest); and τ = 1, that is the maximum level of confidence.
Another interesting result from the first user study regards the preferences about the
relative importance to properly detect a class with respect to the other(s): more than two
thirds of the respondents claimed that they would find more useful a diagnostic support
that could be optimized to be either more specific (37%), and hence better at avoiding
false positive errors, or more sensitive (37%) (and hence better at avoiding false negative
errors), rather than having a balanced support (11%). This means that more than two
thirds of the sample of respondents expressed a preference for models that weight errors
differently according to their type, and that are better at avoiding a kind of error more
frequently than the other.
This gives motivation to consider priority in Ha and suggests that prioritized accu-
racy could differ from regular accuracy according to values of p different from 0.5, that
is in all of those cases where instances should be weighted according to the importance
attached to avoiding false positives or false negatives, and p should be therefore set at
〈0.75,0.25〉 or 〈0.25,0.75〉, respectively. On the other hand, the second user study, the
radiological one, allows to set p indirectly, deriving it from the performance points in
the ROC space (see Figure 4). In analytical terms, Formula 10 can be applied to obtain
p(0) = 0.52,p(1) = 0.48.
Figure 7. A discrete scatter plot showing the proportion of right (red) and wrong labels (blue) as a function of
the discrete levels of confidence and complexity reported by the raters.
From the radiological study we can also extract a new characteristic of the MRNet
dataset: the complexity of its cases. This allows us to compute the practical accuracy
of our ML model (i.e. Ha(d) := Ha(m| 1|C| , 1|C| ,d)). We also considered the practical ac-
curacy obtained when applying a binary threshold dt = 2.75 to the reported complexity
values, i.e. setting d0(x) = 1 for all cases with average reported complexity greater than
2.75 and 0 otherwise. The particular threshold was chosen to obtain approximately an
equal number of difficult and non-difficult cases (see dT 1 in Figure 9). In the Section 4,
we will discuss other thresholds.
Table 2 reports all the accuracy scores mentioned above and derived by Formula 3,
all together with the balanced accuracy and the regular accuracy, as obtained by evalu-
ating the described ML model on the same 417 cases which were also given to classify to
the 13 radiologists; Figure 10 shows the confident and prioritized accuracies (along with
balanced accuracy, Ba = Ha(τ = 0.5) = Ha(p(1) = 0.5)) achieved by the ML model by
visualizing them on the τ and p(1) projections of the whole 3D visualizations of the Ha
surface profile. Comparing Figure 10 with the values reported in Table 1, it can be seen
that the accuracy of the model is only slightly higher than the average accuracy across
the 13 radiologists. We can, furthermore, observe that as argued in Section 1 the regular
accuracy a tends to overestimate the real performances of the model: indeed, in all cases
(except the balanced accuracy Ba, whose equality with a can easily be explained by the
fact that the two classes were near perfectly balanced; and the Ha(p(1) = 0.25, which
puts greater importance on the slightly majority classes l = 0) the instances of the Ha
metrics had values strictly lower than the regular accuracy a. In fact, we can see that the
confident accuracy Ha(τ) monotonically decreases with increasing τ (this also holds for
the Ha measure in general, as can be seen in Figure 11) and the same observation can
be made with respect to the practical accuracy Ha(d) which easily shows that the ML
Figure 8. The distribution of the reported confidence levels with respect to the number of cases correctly
classified by the 13 radiologists.
model was evidently better at classifying the simpler cases than the more complex ones.
Also, we can observe from Figure 13 that on our sample dataset the Ha increases when
a greater priority is assigned to the negative class l = 0 (no abnormality), which can be
easily explained by the observation that the dataset presented a small skew in favor of
this class.
a = Ba = Ha(p : .5) Ha(p : .25) Ha(p : .75)
0.84 0.85 0.83
Ha(τ : .6) Ha(τ : .75) Ha(τ : .8) Ha(τ : 1)
0.82 0.78 0.77 0.69
Ha(τ : 0.75,p : 0.48,d) Ha(d) Ha(d0)
0.76 0.77 0.73
Table 2. Accuracies (regular, balanced and different measures from the Ha metrics) achieved by the ML model
with respect to abnormal/normal classes on a sample of the MRNet dataset (containing only normal cases and
ACL or meniscal tears).
4. DISCUSSION
In Section 2, we provided proof that H-accuracy is a robust measure of accuracy and
demonstrated it is suitable for the assessment of the performance of machine learning
models. This metrics requires to set two parameteres τ and p and determine d(x) that is
the complexity of the cases in the dataset used to assess the model.
In this section, we will share some reflections on the different kinds of accuracy
scores that Formula 3 allows to produce, and on the methods that can be applied to set
the above parameters, to get results like those reported in Table 2 and Figure 10.
Figure 9. The number of cases grouped by complexity level: dT 1, dT 2 and dT 3 represent complexity thresholds
above which lies the 50%, 33% and 20% of the cases, respectively.
4.1. Confidence, for reliability
First, let us consider confident accuracy. This is defined according to values of τ , and
is the accuracy of a system that is at least τ confident of its output, such that we can
claim that “it does not take guesses”. Thus, τ is the threshold of the confidence (in the
membership of instance x in any class l), below which, even if it classifies x correctly, it
is still penalized.
Confident accuracy finds motivation in how human experts behave: in situations
of uncertainty they “don’t usually toss a coin” (τ = 50%) but rather abstain, at least
temporarily, and either look for stronger clues or evidence [26], or refer to the second
opinion of a more expert colleague [33]. When multiple options are available (i.e., in
multi-class tasks), experts can choose the option (e.g., the diagnosis) that is more likely
or plausible among the ones available, but they would still act as the option were true
only when the plausibility is high enough (otherwise, at least in medicine, a “wait and
see” attitude is generally recommended [19]).
Although there are some machine learning applications that apply abstention in con-
ditions of uncertainty (e.g [12,11]), this approach is not commonly adopted, and hence
it is common that decision support systems have users consider recommendations that
are associated with low prediction scores and have a higher chance to be wrong, often
without their knowledge, and hence mislead them.
Setting a τ , and reporting a corresponding confident accuracy (Ha(m|τ), can help
users evaluate this risk; for this reason we recommend to compute (and communicate)
Figure 10. The different accuracies (regular, balanced and different measures derived from the Ha metrics)
achieved by our predictive model with respect to abnormal/normal classes on a sample of the MRNet dataset.
Regular accuracy and a composite estimate of the H-accuracy are highlighted.
several points of confident accuracy, like in Figure 11 to understand the magnitude of
the divergence between regular accuracy and confident accuracy.
On a qualitative basis we recommend setting this acceptability threshold at 51% for
multi-class problems, and higher for binary tasks. In this latter case, τ can be set accord-
ing to different criteria. If confidence is recorded, τ can be the lowest confidence level
expressed by the involved raters that is associated with a sufficient cumulative amount of
right answers (e.g., at least 80%): in our case the corresponding τ was 0.6; alternatively
τ can be the average confidence of the raters, or the average confidence of the best (i.e.,
most accurate) rater expressed during the process, depending on whether the prospective
decision makers need a highly confident (and hence reliable, in some way) advice from
their decision support or not.
Setting a high τ and relying on Ha instead of regular accuracy raises the bar for the
performance of machine learning in real-world settings and reflects the requirement to
have really accurate models that minimize “guessing” behaviors in a sensitive context.
4.1.1. Two sides of a threshold
In light of the relationship between H-accuracy and the Net Benefit demonstrated in
Section 2, we can see that a significant difference between the two measures lies in a
different semantics attached to the probability threshold τ . The semantics of τ in Ha is
specified by the penalty function, σ ; therefore adopting a specific formulation for this
sort of weighting function of right predictions allows to assimilate the two semantics.
Figure 11. The values for the confident accuracy at different confidences τ = .5, .6, .75, .8,1.
Let’s see if the equivalence found by Theorem 1 makes sense for the practical eval-
uation of decision support models. As hinted above, in the formulation of NB (as well
as in ROC analysis), the τ is intended as a non-symmetric risk threshold [43] associated
with the risk of the case at hand being a true positive and hence requiring a treatment. In
the NB framework, the above asymmetry lies in the higher importance of the condition
“being a true positive” (and the related costs of missing it): in this light, τ can also be
seen as the probability threshold above which the model must classify instance x as pos-
itive (1) to bring benefit, and below which it must state the opposite (obviously). Thus,
while in the formulation of Ha given in Equation 3 τ is set equal for all classes, for NB
this is set for the positive class, and 1− τ holds for the alternative option.
Also τ in the NB can be set according to a number of criteria (except the optimiza-
tion of net benefit itself [24]): most of the time this choice is driven by an intuitive as-
sessment of the relative harm of false positives and false negatives with respect to the
magnitude of both costs and benefits (i.e., τ = costs/(bene f its+ costs)6), which often
6In this footnote we give informal proof of this equivalence in the scenario of establishing whether a medical
depends on individual preferences and contextual factors, including the prevalence (that
is occurrence in the observed population) of the positive class (i.e., τ = pi).
On the other hand, the formulation of Ha given in Equation 3 adopts τ as a symmet-
ric confidence threshold, that is as a sort of credibility score that penalizes low confidence
in both classes equally, thus rewarding models that minimize the number of predictions
which are correct only by chance. This behavior is particularly meaningful when the two
classes have similar consequences and outcomes, for instance when both classes corre-
spond to different conditions that have similar costs of false positives and negatives, and
when we are primarily interested in obtaining classifiers whose all predictions are highly
confident, as a proxy for reliability.
As anticipated above, Ha can be made similar to NB unless for a multiplication
factor, through a specific σ function (e.g. see Equation 7 for a function that mirrors the
risk-based behavior of NB).
An illustration of this relation is shown in Figure 12, which reports the behaviour
of NB, sNB, Ha(m|τ) and Ha(m|τ,σrisk) (see Equation 7) to varying of the value of
τ . As regards Ha, since τ acts as a symmetric confidence threshold, the value of the
accuracy monotonically decreases when τ increases because we increasingly penalize
non-confident predictions. On the other hand, for NB, sNB and Ha(m|τ,σrisk) τ acts as a
risk threshold. When it is low (resp. high) there will be a preference for treatment (resp.
no treatment) and a lower (higher) weight will be attached to the true positives (resp. true
negatives), thus resulting in a symmetric curve. In the NB and sNB measures, the risk
threshold reflects the cost associated with false positives, which exponentially increases
to increasing of τ , thus driving towards negative scores: in this sense, these two measures
are appropriately interpreted as the utility-based indicator of the value of a predictive
model.
On the other hand, Ha can be considered a usefulness-oriented indicator of the value
of a predictive model, as well as an indicator of accuracy, as the name suggests. The two
concepts are obviously related, but different and, we claim, tightly complementary: ex-
pressing in other words the result of Theorem 1, we can say that H-accuracy, as any ac-
curacy estimation, yields a probabilistic estimate of the discriminative power of a model;
when this is discounted by the uncertainty acknowledged at the core of the discrimina-
tive process (1-τ , that is but an estimate of what separates us from making certain pre-
dictions), we also get an estimation of the net benefit this model can yield if adopted in
human decision making.
4.2. Priority, for tailorability
As we said in the previous section, a cost-benefit analysis assumes that the posituve class
is more important than the negative one. In the Ha formulation, class priority can be fully
customized. By setting different class priority, p, prioritized accuracy can be defined.
intervention (e.g., a treatment) should be performed or not. Let us then denote with a,b,c,d, respectively, the
utilities related to the possible events disease + treatment, no disease + treatment, disease + no treatment, no
disease + no treatment. Then, the NB can be derived [34,40], by assuming that τ is a probability threshold at
which a patient would be uncertain between accepting the treatment or not (that is between being considered
at high-risk or not [24]), by setting a− c = 1 (i.e. the utility of a true positive) and solving for b− d (i.e. the
utility of a false positive) in a−cd−b =
B
C
1−τ
τ , where B (resp. C) is the benefit (resp. cost) of undergoing treatment,
thus τ = CB+C .
Figure 12. The behaviour of NB,sNB,Ha(m|τ),Ha(m|τ,σrisk) with respect to τ is illustrated. In the graph of
the Ha(m|τ,σrisk) we can observe that the score goes to 1 when τ goes to 0 or 1. This behaviour depends on
the fact that using the priorities specified by Theorem 1 changing τ reduces the importance of one of the two
classes (namely, when τ = 0 cases in the negative class are completely ignored, when τ = 1 the same holds for
the positive class).
Values of p can be seen as a sort of weight attached to rightly predicting one class over the
others, and can be set naively: for instance, if Ha(m|p) must express a clear preference
for specificity, p could be associated with 0.75 (and 0.25 with respect to sensitivity); and
vice versa in case of a preference for sensitivity. Otherwise, if no preference is expressed,
a balanced weighting (0.5 – 0.5) can be adopted.
On the other hand, priority p can be set empirically in two ways: either explicitly
or implicitly. The explicit way entails to get the prevalence of each class in the refer-
ence population or to collect the preferences of a panel of experts for the classification
task at hand by means of a psychometric questionnaire. In this latter case, radiologists
could express different class priorities for different exams (x-rays, MRI, CTs), for dif-
ferent pathologies (fractures, lesions, tumors), and differently from other specialists, like
orthopedists and oncologists. In the former case, class priority can be set according to
class prevalence pi , or its complement (1− pi) if rare cases should be considered less
(more) important to detect, respectively. On the other hand, the implicit case occurs when
experts are involved as dataset labelers, and p is set according to their performance by
means of Formula 10.
A last way to define p, in the binary case, is suggested by the relation established
between Ha and the NB. Indeed, in light of the utility-based definition of τ given in
Section 2, p can be defined as a function of both a particular value of τ and of the
prevalence of the positive class pi as p = α ∗ 〈τ ∗ (1− pi),(1− τ) ∗ pi〉 where α is a
normalization factor.
Figure 13. The values for the prioritized accuracy at different values of the priority for the positive class
p(1) = 0.25,0.5,0.75.
4.3. Complexity, for usefulness
As said in the previous section, class priority is a way to embed class importance into
an accuracy metrics. On the other hand, the function d(x) is a way to consider particu-
lar types (implicitly so) of instances important. For this contribution we chose to limit
ourselves in considering important complex cases, that is the cases for which a decision
support could be more useful. In particular, with the term complexity we here refer to
the decision effort and difficulty to classify an instance of the test set. We can have a
visual rendering of complexity, naive as it may seem, by looking at Figure 4: if classifi-
cation experts are involved (like radiology diagnosticians), it is the difficulty of the cases
that they reviewed that prevents the points representing their performance to be all close
together and piled up at the top left corner of the ROC space.
However, by looking at the diagram and looking up the accuracy data reported in
Table 1, the reader should resist the temptation to compare the radiologists involved in
the MRNet labeling task the machine performance at the same task: in this paper, we are
making the case of providing multiple accuracy measures to describe the performance of
a classification model in a more informative manner; we are not suggesting that a specific
model outperformed human decision makers, as claimed in many paper recently [27,36].
This is not the case because the radiologists involved in this study reviewed the imaging
that was made available in the MRNet dataset, and not the original, high-res images
from which that dataset has been produced, and they did it on standard monitor sets,
not on calibrated screens. Moreover, the radiologists were obviously aware that they
were involved in an experimental setting: although we took care in explaining that the
task required their maximum attention not to put noise into the dataset labelling, also
a laboratory effect should be factored in [21], that is the fact that their performance in
this experiment should not be considered representative of their reading skills in real-life
settings at any extent.
But how should d(x) be determined, and hence the practical accuracy score? Here,
we recall that d(x) is a function returning a complexity score for each case x, that is how
hard it is to correctly classify the case. This function can be determined in different ways,
among which we can distinguish between direct and indirect methods. In regard to the
former approach: we can ask the doctors involved to express whether they found a case
x (from the test set, or the whole dataset under consideration, either at ground truthing or
also subsequently, on an already established gold standard) difficult or not (0 or 1), as if
we asked them if that case deserves to be shared with a class of residents or trainees, or
even with the specialist community, as a case report [32]. Similarly, we could ask them
to rate how difficult they perceived the case x on an ordinal scale. This kind of rating can
also be used to distinguish the cases between simple ones (still, 0) and complex (1), on
the basis of a given threshold dT , beyond which a case is considered to be complex and
difficult to interpret.
The threshold dT can be fixed a priori, like dT = 0.5 on a normalized scale, or on
the basis of the ratings collected empirically. For instance, with reference to Figure 9,
the threshold of complexity can be set at the average case complexity (dT = 0.275), or
in such a way that only the most difficult portion of cases are considered. What portion
of cases to consider is an open issue, though. In our case study, we considered the 50%
of cases, not to reduce the test set too much. However, in another study (unpublished),
we extracted 1153 wrist x-rays from the more than 47000 wrist radiographs taken at the
Galeazzi institute in the 2002-2018 period: in this case, the cases considered complex
(with comminuted fractures) by a top-performance radiologist were exactly one third
(33%), while the simple ones (with compound fractures) were the 20% of the sample
(with a 47% of negative images). On the other hand, others [7] suggest to be even more
selective: “the 80 – 20 rule has been said to apply to the cases an experienced physician
sees in his or her practice. That is, about 80% of the patients have conditions that are
fairly easily diagnosed. For this large majority of cases, not only are clinical decision
support systems not needed, using them would be an inefficient use of the physicians
time and might even lead to expensive and unnecessary additional diagnostic testing.”.
Thus, by choosing dT to be 0.5, instead of 0.33 or even 0.2 in our user study, we chose a
conservative estimation for d(x) (see Figure 9).
Alternatively, once a gold standard is available or has been established, also indirect
methods are possible; for instance d(x) can be set on the basis of the error rate of the
raters involved for that specific case x: the higher, the more difficult the case is; or on the
basis of the confidence the raters express in assessing the case, irrespective of whether
their answer was correct or not (the lower the confidence, the higher the complexity – see
Figures 6 and 7); or, still, by combining accuracy and subjective confidence together.
Additionally, also the average accuracy of the raters (that is their accuracy on the whole
dataset), seen as a proxy of proficiency, can be used to modulate the subjective perception
of complexity: if a case is perceived difficult by a top performer its complexity should
be considered higher than if only the low-performers considered it such. Proficiency, in
its turn, can be assessed by self-assessment, or by combining basal (self-)assessment and
task performance. Many approaches can be pursued: future research is then necessary to
understand what approach makes more sense in different clinical settings.
Above, we hinted at the use of ordinal scales to let raters assess the complexity of
a case. The choice of a proper scale is far from being a trivial task. In designing our
user study, we considered two alternatives, but adopted one of them eventually: a first
approach that we could call semantic, and an alternative one, pragmatic. The semantic
rating scale was conceived as a traditional 6-value semantic differential ranging from
1 (“very easy case”) to 6 (“very difficult case”). This choice sounds reasonable as this
scale is common in many psychometric assessments. However, by discussing with the
radiologists, we observed that having a group of medical raters agree on a common way
to assess case complexity homogeneously is a hard, if not over-ambitious, task: the re-
sulting ratings would be affected by a too large amount of arbitrariness, and hence noise;
to put it naively, “it’s easy what you know how to do; the rest is difficult”.
Therefore, we preferred to adopt the pragmatic scale: to trace back relatively few
complexity levels (in our case 4), to the reasonable expectations of the raters in regard to
easy-to-delimit professional categories and their exam reading proficiency. In particular
we identified the following categories: non-specialist doctors, associated with level 1;
residents (as specialist-to-be doctors), as level 2; specialists within a broad specialty (like
radiology - level 3); and sub-specialists (as specialists who further specialize in a kind
of disease or exam, like orthopedic radiology, or even more narrowly, MRI orthopedic
radiologist), as level 4. To avoid the reasonable objection that not all specialists are the
same, we formulated the ordinal levels by referring to the capability of a “large majority”
of people from a professional category to correctly classify a specific case. Consequently,
also a fifth category could be considered: cases that “only a few sub-specialists, the very
best ones, could solve” (level 5).
Why assessing complexity is important, and therefore practical accuracy is? Also
in this case, it is naturalistic decision making [25] that motivates this idea. Think of a
very accurate decision support for trivial or easy cases: the medical experts would not
consult it, or if they do, would neglect and override it with no regret or doubt in case they
disagreed with it7. Conversely, complex cases are those for which even experts would
like to receive confirmation or, if lost about them, a proper aid. In these cases, right
advice can have a strong impact on the final decision, and wrong advice can mislead the
decision makers, a situation that could be worsened by the automation bias mentioned
above (i.e., over-reliance on the support, which could be induced by a higher, almost
oracular, accuracy exhibited by the system on the easy cases).
For these reasons, we deem the practical accuracy an important measure to com-
pute and report, to understand the real usefulness of a decision support in naturalistic
(i.e., real-world) decision making by expert practitioners. Consequently, further research
should be aimed at understanding what the best way to represent medical complexity
(i.e., d(x) in Ha) is, and also whether this construct should be integrated with some re-
7Here let us just hint at the impact of these “easy misses” on doctors’ trust and on the perceived reliability
of the support.
lated information, like relevance. Intuitively, this latter dimension could relate to simi-
lar but slightly different concepts, like rarity, significance, seriousness, or the impact of
missing the right interpretation for the patient’s recovery8. An evaluation, expressed by
experts, of these further concepts could be transparently integrated in the definition of
d(x), thus obtaining a multi-faceted representation of the importance of correctly clas-
sifying specific cases by simply combining (e.g. via linear combination) all these dif-
ferent factors to obtain a single, weighting function mirroring the needs of the clinical
practitioners.
Two limitations of this study regard complexity: first, the involved radiologists did
not evaluate the complexity of the whole MRNet dataset, but of a sample of 417 cases,
randomly drawn from the former set. Second, they did not assess the complexity of the
original imaging from which the MRNet dataset was derived.
In particular the doctors reviewed all the imaging in three projections, (i.e., axial,
coronal, sagittal planes); each plane was associated with a single picture 1920-pixel high
and 1152-pixel wide that was composed of a varying number of smaller pictures, the
single “cuts”, up to 48. The platform allowed the doctors to inspect each image with a
“magnifying glass”, a squared area of 200 x 200 pixel, like in Figure 14.
Figure 14. An example of how the radiologists could review the MRnet imaging in the online questionnaire
platform we developed for this study.
In regard to the latter point, we conjecture that a low-quality imaging would make
reported complexity higher in absolute terms than in a high-quality setting, but likely not
too different in relative terms. Since the equation of H-accuracy (see Formula 3) normal-
izes complexity scores, we deem this limitation having low impact on our argumenta-
tion. Likewise in regard to the former point, the random selection of the cases from the
MRNet Knee MRI Dataset (417 out of 1370) should keep the margin of error below the
conventional threshold of 5%, and make our argumentation affected by this limitation
only marginally, if any.
8These are nuances that the H-accuracy allows to specify more accurately than what the Net benefit construct
allows
As a bottom-line reflection, let us look at the different accuracy scores reported in
Table 2 and Figure 10. The best model on the MRNet dataset (a deep learning neural
network [8]) exhibits a regular accuracy of 0.85. Our deep learning model, tested on
a subset of that dataset, is only slightly worse: 0.84. Since our test set was balanced
with respect to abnormal/normal cases, the regular and balanced accuracy of our model
coincide.
The performance of both predictive models seem much lower than what the doctors
involved in our first user study expressed as the minimum accuracy to have a useful sup-
port. Obviously, this depends on the people involved, their expertise and their specialty:
we conjecture that oncologists could express different preferences than orthopedists, and
likely each setting could host users with different expectations and attitude towards an
Artificial Intelligence support.
However, the main point of this contribution is another one: the performance of both
models are even lower than what depicted by the regular accuracy figure. If we weight
less the cases in which the models could have just guessed the right answer (τ > .75), we
get a worse performance, by even 15 percentage points (if we demand the highest confi-
dence by the model). If we consider the complexity of cases, we get a worse performance
by 7 and even 11 percentage points if, respectively, we consider an ordinal (4-value)
spectrum of complexity (with our pragmatic scale), or a more common dichotomous
distinction.
Different research groups and companies across the world in the domain of machine-
learning based decision support struggle to surpass competitors even by a few percentage
points in accuracy (or related measures), with a common “psychological” threshold to
interest the medical stakeholders set to 80% at least [16]: besides these figures, in this
paper we made the point that is important to inform stakeholders and practitioners by
also showing them alternative accuracy measures, with a clear clinical and practical
meaning, as H-accuracy aims to be.
5. Conclusions
With the increasing need for prospective studies in the field, and third-party certifications
of AI-based decision supports (seen by the FDA as Software as a Medical Device or
as Medical Device Software by the European Medical Devices Regulation), competent
authorities, regulators, AI manufacturers, distributors, and health-care providers, all need
meaningful ways to assess the performance of these systems in clinical practice.
We are not the first ones to point out how the current use of the accuracy indicator
for understanding and reporting how well a classification model works (even assuming
a proper testing process producing such an indicator) falls short of communicating the
most important feature of a decision support, that is being useful in daily practice.
Indeed, other contributions have discussed the limits of common performance mea-
sures, like the AUC [22,28,35] and accuracy itself [37,39]) and proposed how to mini-
mize the odds of misinformation about ML model performance, usually by recommend-
ing to provide a number of different measures.
Conversely, we made the point that the medical community (like many others that
increasingly rely on predictive models and decision support systems) must have few,
summative but yet comprehensive and informative ways to learn about, compare, report
on, and communicate about the “skills” of Artificial Intelligence in medicine – ideally
a single measure – and stick with this, also to allow for fair comparisons. Recently,
Mandrola and Morgan in [29], to warn of the risks of incidental findings and the related
overuse that a highly sensitive decision support could exacerbate, have observed how
“the problem with decision support is that it must be designed to add value and be easily
accessible without increasing burden for clinicians [. . . that is it] needs to better provide
relevant information at the point of care to make decision-making easier for clinicians.”
(our emphasis). Some author has then recently proposed this one best measure is the
Matthew correlation coefficient [13], which is not affected by class imbalance and is
generalizable to multiclass settings. However, this metrics is not intuitively related to
error rate and, mostly important, does not consider the characteristics of the available
data, nor the preferences of the intended model users.
For this reason, in this paper we proposed a novel metrics that takes into account
the above elements, to provide an indicator of the reliability and value of the potential
advice by a decision support. In particular, by providing an analytical formulation of
this metrics, we also pointed out meaningful areas of the resulting function to focus
on specific aspects of the model performance, like reliability (cf. τ), practicality (cf.
d) and priority (cf. p), and suggested some empirical values to report that we believe
could inform the users adopting an ML model exhibiting such skills, namely confident,
prioritized, and practical accuracy. To our knowledge, H-accuracy is the first metrics
to go beyond what can be known of a model’s performance from the confusion matrix,
while still being related to the intuitive notion of “getting classification right”9.
However, H-accurcay still regards a static assessment of the accuracy of a prediction
model, evaluated holistically on a whole test dataset, as an indicator of the usefulness of
the model. Our future work will explore a more dynamic and case-dependent assessment,
to define an indicator of the reliability of the model, not on any new case, but on one
particular new case, specifically: this is the case of a sort of local accuracy metrics,
evaluated on the basis of the performance of the model on the n (e.g., 10) most similar
cases in the test set to the new case to classify.
Once more comprehensive static metrics and convenient dynamic metrics will have
been made available to the users, further research should be aimed at evaluating whether
and how much the user experience would change and possibly improve when the deci-
sion makers can learn these additional information about their decision support [6], to
mitigate automation bias, and increase meaningful use and the overall accuracy of teams
of decision makers in real-world settings.
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